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Constitutional Criminal Law
by Peggy Natale*

L

INTRODUCTION

This year, the Eleventh Circuit issued opinions on a variety of criminal
constitutional law cases, including decisions granting writs of habeas
corpus on several death row inmates, and in three cases addressing ineffective assistance of counsel. What follows is a summary of some of the
most important criminal constitutional cases for 1992. No effort has been
made to make an exhaustive review of. all of the court's criminal cases for
the year.
I.

FOURTH AMENDMENT-SEARCH

AND SEIZURE

The Eleventh Circuit reversed on the grounds of a violation of the
Fourth Amendment's provisions regarding unreasonable search and
seizure in United States v. Ellis.' In this case a residential search warrant
incorrectly described the place to be searched as "'the third mobile home
on the north side of Christian Acres Road.' -2Although Officer LaManna,
who prepared the affidavit for the search warrant, had knowledge of defendant Billy Ellis and Ellis' home, he incorrectly described the location
defendant in the warrant, or give any other
of the home, did not name
3
house.
the
of
description
Officer LaManna was not present when the officer executed the search
warrant.4 When the executing officers went to the third mobile home, the
*
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1. 971 F.2d 701 (11th Cir. 1992).
2.

Id. at 702 (quoting the warrant).

3. Id.
4.

Id. at 703.
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owner of that home told them Billy Ellis lived in the fifth mobile home.
The officers then went to that home, which belonged to Ellis, and
searched.6
In reaching the decision in this case, the Eleventh Circuit relied on
Steele v. United States,7 which held that a description of the area to be
searched is valid "if the description is such that the officer with a search
warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended." 8 But the court noted that in this case "the name 'Billy Ellis' did
not appear anywhere on the warrant or the affidavit. As a result, the officers could not use their personal knowledge that Ellis was the target of
the search to cure the warrant's deficiency. ' '
Turning to the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule described
in United States v. Leon,'0 the Eleventh Circuit determined that the
good faith exception was not applicable to this case." In this case, Deputy LaManna's mistake in the address was based on his observations, and
the error was not on the part of the issuing magistrate, as was the case in
Leon. 2 As a result, the officers did not reasonably rely on the warrant in
searching Billy Ellis' home. 3 In fact, the officers did not rely on the warrant at all." As the court pointed out, "the procedure employed in this
case risked a general search."' 5
While in Ellis the court determined that incorrect observations of a
police officer did not meet the good faith exception of Leon,' the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Gonzalez17 determined that as long as it
was reasonable, a police officer's mistaken observation did not negate
probable cause to arrest, even if the mistaken observation was the primary basis of the arrest.' 8 Here, informants told federal agents that three
people were driving to meet a yacht and pick up cocaine. The informants
accurately described the cars, and named the three people and the yacht.
While the trip to meet the boat was not inherently suspicious, the officers
also observed one of the three suspects engage in counter surveillance
5.

Id. at 702-03.

6. Id.
7.
8.
9.
10.

267 U.S. 498 (1925).
Id. at 503.
971 F.2d at 704.
468 U.S. 897 (1984).

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 897.
971 F.2d at 705.
Id.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 705.
Id.
969 F.2d 999 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1006.
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techniques, exceed the speed limit on the way to meet the yacht, keep
watch on the yacht from another vessel, and drive carefully on the return
trip while drugs were in the car.'
However, the person on the other vessel, whom the police believed to
be engaged in this counter-surveillance, turned out to have no connection
with any of these suspects.20 The Eleventh Circuit nevertheless held that
although the police officer was mistaken about the person in the uncon'
nected vessel, the police officer still had probable cause to arrest." The
Eleventh Circuit reasoned that "although 'innocent behavior frequently
will provide the basis for showing of probable cause. . . in making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is "innocent," or "guilty," but the degree of suspicion that
attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.' ",2
The Eleventh Circuit said "the determination that probable cause exists for a warrantless arrest is fundamentally a factual analysis that must
be performed by the officers on the scene. '' s
III. FIFTH AMENDMENT-RIGHT TO SILENCE
A.

Right to Silence

The court addressed the issue of whether the collective entity doctrine
applies to custodians of corporate records who are no longer employed by
a corporation in In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated November 12, 1991
("Paul")." A custodian of corporate documents cannot assert a Fifth
Amendment claim to production of those documents that remain in his or
her' custody even after leaving the employ of the corporation." In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit broadened the already existing collective entity doctrine,' 6 which holds that a custodian of corporate records
does not have the Fifth Amendment right to refuse production of those
documents as determined by the United States Supreme Court in Bellis
v. United States.' Because production of corporate records necessarily
must be accomplished through human representatives, an individual can-

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 1000-01.
Id. at 1002.
Id.
Id. at 1003 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243-44 n.13 (1983)).
Id.
957 F.2d 807 (l1th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 812.
Id. at 813.
417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974).
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not assert his or her Fifth Amendment rights, to avoid production of corporate documents.2
The issue before the Eleventh Circuit in Paul was whether a former
employee of the corporation also loses his or her Fifth Amendment rights
to production of corporate documents. The employee left the corporation's employ before a grand jury investigation began. Mr. Paul took corporate documents with him to use in his personal defense, if needed.29
The Eleventh Circuit expanded the decision in Braswell to include past
employees as well as current employees of the corporation. 0 This decision
conflicts with the Second Circuit's decision in In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum dated June 13, 1983 & June 22, 1983 ("Saxon").3 ' The

Second Circuit had previously determined that "[o]nce the officer leaves
the company's employ. .,. he no longer acts as a corporate representative
but functions
in an individual capacity in his possession of corporate
'
records." "3

Noting that the decision in Saxon predated Braswell," the Eleventh
Circuit focused on the nature of the records themselves rather than in
whose custody they fell. The key factor was not the relationship of the
custodian to the entity, but the character of the records themselves as
corporate records.4

In United States v. Moody,"5 defendant was charged with bombings
that caused the death of a federal judge and an attorney.' He contended
that the taping of his conversations at home with his wife, as well as the
taping of soliloquies of defendant talking to himself in his jail cell did
violate the Fifth Amendment because there was coercive police activity in
7
connection with defendant's statements.'
The Government taped certain "soliloquies" in which the defendant
talked to himself about having committed two killings and made vitriolic
statements about the court system." The court held these were not the
result of inadequate minimization in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) and
that the trial court had not erred in crediting the monitoring agents' as28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 111-12 (1988).
957 F.2d at 809.
Id. at 812.
722 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 986-87.
957 F.2d at 811.
Id. at 812.
977 F.2d 1425 (11th Cir. 1992).
id. at 1428.
Id. at 1433-35.
Id. at 1433-34.
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sertions that they could always determine whether defendant was con9
versing with anyone or was instead talking to himself.3
Defendant had challenged the in prison surveillance under doctrines
relevant to custodial interrogation, specifically Miranda v. Arizona 40 and
the Due Process Clause, but the Eleventh Circuit found that these arguments failed due to the absence of any coercive police activity in connection with defendant's statements.4
B. Due Process
In United States v. Gayle,'" defendant was charged with fraudulently
impersonating a federal officer or employee in violation of 18 U.S.C
§ 912.' 8 Congress had amended the statute and eliminated the words
"'with intent to defraud.' " The appellant argued that the wbrds "intent
to defraud" were a necessary element of the crime charged and were not
included in his indictment.' 5 In reaching its decision, the court departed
from its predecessor, the Fifth Circuit, which previously had held that an
intent to defraud or to wrongfully deprive another of property was an
essential element of this crime.' In rejecting the Fifth Circuit's decision,
the Eleventh Circuit aligned itself with decisions of the Third, Eighth,
and D.C. Circuits, which held that the intent to defraud continues to be
an element of the crime, but need not be specifically alleged in the indictment;47 that the intent to defraud "is automatically present anytime the
other elements of the offense (i.e. [1] acting as such or [2] obtaining
something of value) are proven." 8 The decision in Gayle specifically rejected opinions of the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits,
which have held that by amending the statute, Congress eliminated that
element entirely from the offense. 9
39. Id.
40. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
41. 977 F.2d at 1434.
42. 967 F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1992).
43. Id. at 485.
44. Id. at 486 (quoting the prior statute).
45. Id. at 484.
46. Id. at 486.
47. Id. at 486-87.
48. Id, See generally United States v. Wilkes, 732 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 964 (1984); United States v. Robbins, 613 F.2d 688 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Rosser, 528 F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
49. 967 F.2d at 486. See generally United States v. Guthrie, 387 F.2d 569 (4th Cir. 1967);
United States v. Rose, 500 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 956 (1976); United
States v. Mitman, 459 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 863 (1972).
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Due process was again addressed by the court in United States v.
Yesil,50. which held a trial court's failure to hear evidence of defendant's
cooperation, as required by the previously accepted plea agreement, violated defendant's due process rights.5 1 In this case, the written plea agreements required each defendant to cooperate with the Government and
specified that upon completion of each defendant's cooperation, the Government would notify the court of the nature and extent of the cooperation." In an unusual scenario, both defendants and the Government appealed the trial-court's denial of an evidentiary hearing on a Rule 35
53
motion for reduction of sentence.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision did not disagree with the trial court's
denial of the Rule 35 motion, but rather with the trial court's failure to
grant an evidentiary hearing on defendants' cooperation." At the original
sentencing hearing, the court heard testimony from an agent regarding
defendants' ongoing cooperation, and the court sentenced all defendants
to a six year term, with three years special parole and a $150,000 fine. 5'
The court also ordered defendants to surrender voluntarily in six months
and serve the sentence."
Both defendants and the Government urged the trial court to reduce
the sentence pursuant to Rule 35." Attached to the Rule 35 motion were
letters from detectives setting forth defendants' cooperation since the
plea, resulting in indictments in at least eleven drug trafficking cases.' 8
The letters also apprised the court of defendants' ongoing cooperation
and requested a hearing.5 The court denied the reduction of sentence for
two defendants and granted one defendant a reduction of his sentence.6
In all three cases, however, the trial court denied an evidentiary hearing
regarding the extent of defendants' cooperation. 1
Although a defendant generally cannot appeal a court's refusal to grant
a downward departure in sentencing, this case involved an appeal of the
2
court's refusal to grant an evidentiary hearing on the Rule 35 motion.
The Eleventh Circuit held that a trial court's discretion in granting an
50.
51.

968 F.2d 1122 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1124.

52. Id.
53.
54.

Id. at 1125.
Id. at 1128.

55.
56.

Id. at 1123-25.
Id. at 1125.

57.

Id.

58.
59.
60.
61,
62.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1124-25.
1125-27,
1124.
1127.
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evidentiary hearing is "'severely' curtailed once that court accepts a plea
bargain" as in this case." In reaching its decision to remand the case for
an evidentiary hearing on the Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence,
the Eleventh Circuit noted that Rule 11(e), governing plea agreements,
requires the trial court to comply with the terms of the plea agreement
once the court accepts the plea. s" "[It is a denial of due process to assure
a defendant that he will receive a certain process and then to renege on
that promise or merely pay it lip service."' 6
Judge Hatchett dissented from the majority ruling and focused on the
fact that this was a Government appeal without commenting on the fact
that it was a defense appeal as well." Nevertheless, the dissent's rationale
was that the Government could not appeal the denial of an evidentiary
hearing, and that the decision to grant an evidentiary hearing was totally
discretionary within the trial court."' His fear that this decision might
result in granting the Government more control than the courts have on
sentencing issues is summed up as follows: "With this opinion, district
court judges are prohibited from even deciding when to set sentencing
hearings and what kind of hearings to conduct. The Government, through
this opinion, has become more than a litigant in the courts of this
circuit.""
A defendant's reliance on a plea agreement again was addressed by the
Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Rewis." Here, the Government
breached the plea agreement with defendant by informing the court of
defendant's failure to cooperate.7 ' Rewis, a commercial fisherman,
pleaded guilty to possession of more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana
1
and conspiracy to distribute.7
The plea agreement provided that "the government reserves its right of
allocution, that is, to make known to the United States Probation Office
and to the Court all relevant facts regarding the offenses. However, the
government agrees not to recommend what, sentence should be imposed.' 72 The plea agreement also specifically provided that Mr. Rewis
was under no obligation to cooperate, but if he did cooperate, the Govern-

63. Id. (citing United States v. Runck, 601 F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1015 (1980)).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1128 (citing United States v. Thomas, 580 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1130 (1979)).
66. Id. at 1129.
67. Id. at 1130.
68. Id. at 1131.
69. 969 F.2d 985 (11th Cir. 1992).
70. Id. at 987.
71.. Id. at 986.
72. Id. at 987.
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ment would ask the court for a downward departure from the sentencing
guidelines.73
Defendant did not cooperate. At sentencing the government, through
its memorandum, advised the court of defendant's failure to cooperate
and stated that defendant persuaded others not to cooperate. 4 The Government went on to say:
This man would rather remain an "outlaw smuggler" with a code of silence and intimidation, part of the problem, than become part of the
solution ....

[Hie will say nothing about past or current activities in-

volving smuggling despite all government efforts to gain his cooperation.
If he were truly sorry. . . he would have cooperated."
The district court sentenced defendant to forty years without parole on
all four counts, plus five years special parole on the two substantive
counts. 6
The Eleventh Circuit recognized that the plea agreement rested in a
significant degree on the promise of the government, and that a defendant is entitled to specific performance on that agreement." Following the
method of interpreting plea agreements previously set forth by the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Jefferies'78 the court reiterated that a
plea agreement constitutes a waiver of "substantial constitutional rights"
and if Mr. Rewis' reasonable understanding of the plea agreement was
not enforced, the trial court could not find that defendant was actually
aware of the consequences of his plea. 9 In its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit noted that in this case, even though the Government may not have
specifically recommended a harsher sentence, the Government's comments in its sentencing memorandum suggested a harsher sentence,
which violated the plea agreement." Furthermore, the case was remanded
for resentencing before a different district court.8 1
In United States v. Rodriguez," the Eleventh Circuit held that a trial
judge could not weigh a defendant's exercise of his or her constitutional
rights in deciding whether to grant a reduction in offense for "acceptance
of responsibility" under the sentencing guidelines. 8 3 The court held that
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 986.
Id. at 988.
908 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir. 1990).
969 F.2d at 988.
Id. at 986.
Id. at 989.
959 F.2d 193 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 197.
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the trial judge erred in denying defendant the sentencing guidelines' "acceptance of responsibility" reduction in points 4 by considering defendant's failure to forego his Fifth Amendment privilege.8
Defendants had expressed their remorse to the probation officer who
prepared the pre-sentence investigation report and recommended to the
court that it grant a two level reduction for acceptance of responsibility."
The sentencing judge, however, conditioned the reduction on defendants'
admission of guilt in open court, 87 obviously jeopardizing the defendants'
appellate rights and right against self incrimination.
Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provides that a defendant must be awarded a two level reduction in offense level if the defendant clearly displays acceptance of personal responsibility for his
crime, whether or not he has gone to trial." Although the Eleventh Circuit has in the past rejected Fifth and Sixth Amendment challenges to
this sentencing provision, 8 the court held that a sentencing court cannot
consider a defendant's constitutionally protected conduct against him, in
this case his right to remain silent." The Eleventh Circuit noted, however, that it is not a constitutional violation to provide incentives to
forego a constitutional right and a defendant's capacity to receive acceptance of the responsibility reduction may well be diminished when a defendant exercises his or her full panoply of rights.8 '
IV.

SIXTH AMENDMENT

Attorney Client Privilege

A.

The Eleventh Circuit eroded the attorney-client privilege by holding
that an attorney must testify before the grand jury regarding his source of
counterfeit one-hundred dollar bills, even if his clients gave him the counterfeit bills.8 2 The attorney sought to quash the grand jury subpoena on
the grounds that the identity of his clients was protected under the attorney-client privilege.' 5 The district court quashed the subpoena noting
84.

FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

3EI.I (1987).

85. 959 F.2d at 195-97.
86. Id. at 195.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.

89. United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Crawford,
906 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1990).
90. 959 F.2d at 197.
91. Id.
92. In re Grand Jury Matter No. 91-01386, 969 F.2d 995 (11th Cir. 1992).
93. Id. at 996.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

1152

[Vol. 44

that a client's identity and fee agreement generally are not privileged.9 4
However, the case of United States v. Hodge & Zweig"' determined that
a client's identity and fee agreement may be privileged when the person
invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosing the clients identity would implicate that client in the criminal activity for which legal advice was sought. 6
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and held
that the facts of this case did not fall within the exception in Hodge &
Zweig.97 The court reasoned that "[m]erely because the matter which will
be disclosed may incriminate the client does not make the matter privileged." 98 The court examined the "last link" doctrine relied on in Hodge

& Zweig. 9

The "last link" doctrine recognizes the attorney-client privilege when
the identity of the client might be the link that forms the chain of testimony necessary to convict the individual of a federal crime.10 0 The Eleventh Circuit, however, relied on its previous decision in In re Grand Jury
Proceedings ("Rabin"),10 ' which held that the "last link" doctrine extends the attorney-client privilege to nonprivileged information only
when "disclosure of that identity would disclose other, privileged communications (e.g., motive or strategy) and when the incriminating nature of
the privileged communications has created in the client a reasonable expectation that the information would be kept confidential." ' 02 The court
further reasoned that in the present case, disclosure of the nonprivileged
client identity does not
result in linking the clients with confidences that
03
would be protected.

B. Ineffective Counsel
The Eleventh Circuit reversed two capital murder cases on the basis of
ineffective assistance at trial. A death row inmate's case was remanded

for a new penalty phase in.Cave v. Singletary10 4 primarily due to ineffec-

tive assistance of trial counsel. 00 In Cave an employee of a convenience
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104,
105.

Id. at 997.
548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1353.
In re Grand Jury Matter No. 91-01386, 969 F.2d at 998-99.
Id. at 998.
Id.
Id. at 997.
896 F.2d 1267 (11th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1273.
Id. at 1274.
971 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1992),
Id. at 1529.
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store was robbed by four men, shot in the head, and stabbed in the abdomen. The bullet to the head was the cause of death. All defendants were
tried separately. Cave was convicted of first degree murder and, sentenced
to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Cave's conviction and
death sentence.'" On petition for habeas corpus, the federal district court
held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that Cave had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which had prejudiced Cave only at the
sentencing phase.10 7 The Eleventh Circuit agreed. 08
In a prime example of why federal habeas corpus review is so critical to
our system of justice, the Eleventh Circuit determined Cave's trial counsel, Ms. Steger, obviously had not understood the crime of felony murder
and, therefore, did not adequately represent petitioner at this trial. 0 9 Apparently, Ms. Steger argued at the trial level that defendant admitted his
guilt of the robbery, but should not be found guilty of first degree murder. 1 0 The court held that the attorney did not understand the elements
of felony murder, that her statements regarding Cave's guilt of the robbery necessarily established his guilt for first degree murder under felony
murder,' and that "her performance fell far below the acceptable standard for competent counsel.""' At the federal evidentiary hearing, Ms.
Steger contended that she had indeed understood the felony murder rule,
but purposely misstated that law her in closing argument to confuse the
jury.' 13 One other attorney, however, testified that in his discussions with
Ms. Steger the night before her closing arguments, he had concluded that
she had not understood the felony murder rule. Cave's attorney had indicated that her defense to the first degree murder was that Cave was not
the person who shot the gun that caused the murder." 4 Another attorney
who met with Cave's attorney after the trial to discuss appealable issues
concluded that she did not understand that her closing argument was legally incorrect."0
"Even if counsel's misstatements of the law were strategic in nature, we
could not consider such a 'strategy' to be reasonable under the circumstances because defense counsel may not 'encourage [the] jurors to ignore
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 1514.
Id. at 1515.
Id. at 1529-30.
Id. at 1518.
Id. at 1517.
Id.
Id,at 1518.
Id. at 1517.

Id
Id,at 1518,
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the court's instruction and apply the law at their caprice.' "$" The Eleventh Circuit spoke of Cave's trial attorney as follows:
We are troubled by the fact that a defendant facing the possibility of
execution in Florida's electric chair was defended by counsel who, in the
words of the district court, had a "grandiose, perhaps even delusional"
belief in her abilities, especially so because she was trying her first capital case. We are convinced that Steger completely misunderstood the law
of felony murder, which is a concept that often confuses laypeople, but
should be within the grasp of lawyers,
especially those defending a client
17
charged with a capital offense.'
At the trial level sentencing hearing, the defense did not offer any witnesses for mitigation." 8 Yet, at the evidentiary hearing in the federal district court, Cave produced several family members who testified that, had
they been asked, they would have testified regarding Cave's good character at the sentencing phase of the trial.119 They also testified that Steger
had told them they were not needed. 20 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with
the district court finding that the absence of witnesses 2 at the sentencing
hearing was the result of Steger's lack of preparation.1 '
But the Eleventh Circuit was not disturbed enough by Steger's representation of Cave to grant him a new trial and-held that "even a highly
competent lawyer could not have won Cave an acquittal" because "[h]is
confession to robbery sealed his conviction for felony murder" and Cave
had offered no reason to suppress his confession.2 2 The court held Steger's representation was constitutionally inadequate and that Cave was
prejudiced at the penalty phase. 2 3 Therefore,
the jury verdict of seven to
24
five for death was reversed and remanded.
In Waters v. Zant,' 2 1 a divided Eleventh Circuit again held that a
habeas corpus petitioner had received ineffective assistance of counsel at
his 1981 capital murder trial.2 6 The trial attorney, who had not tried a
murder case since 1955, presented all his defense witnesses during the
guilt phase, and none, except for defendant, during the sentencing
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. (quoting United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102 (11th Cir. 1983)).

Id,
Id. at 1516.
Id. at 1519.
Id. at 1516.
Id. at 1519.
Id. at 1518.
Id. at 1519.
Id. at 1522.
979 F.2d 1473 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1475.
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phase. 1 7 In this case, evidence of mental illness existed. " , Although the
defense witnesses did not allege that it rose to the level of insanity, the
mental illness could have been a mitigating factor at the sentencing
phase
12
had it been presented at the sentencing hearing to the jury.
Waters, the petitioner, was convicted of murder in Georgia.13 He had
forced two women at gunpoint to leave their cars and go to a secluded
location where one was sexually assaulted and both were shot and
killed.'M Although the evidence of guilt at trial was "overwhelming," '
the court held counsel's performance at sentencing was constitutionally
inadequate.' 3
The evidence showed that Waters had previously been diagnosed as a
paranoid schizophrenic and had ceased taking his anti-psychotic medication three weeks before the murders.1 3 The defense at trial was insanity,
but trial counsel conceded at a state habeas proceeding that he only expected the jury to return a life sentence rather than death.' 5 At the guilt
phase of the trial no mental health expert testified that Waters was insane and several gave testimony that was damaging to Waters' mercy
plea.'3 6 Only Waters testified on his own behalf during the. sentencing
37
phase, and the defense did not call mental health experts.
The court determined that counsel had tried Waters' case "just as a
criminal defense lawyer would have prior to Furman v. Georgia'38 and its
sequel[]" by pleading insanity, putting in the psychiatric evidence, and
seeking the jury's sympathy.'3 The court noted that since Furman, statutes and systems for imposing the death penalty must focus on the nature of the crime and character of the accused and must provide some
guidance for the jury in determining whether the death penalty should be
imposed in each case.1 4 0 This was not accomplished in Waters' trial.
The court noted that "[flederal courts generally will not second-guess a
trial counsel's strategic decision, so long as the decision is reasonable.'
127. Id. at 1477-78.
128. Id. at 1478-79.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1475.
131. Id.
132. Id.at 1490.
133. Id. at 1491.
134. Id. at 1478-79.
135. Id. at 1478.
136. Id. at 1478-79.
137. Id. at 1478, 1495.
138. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
139. 979 F.2d at 1492.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1494 (citing Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 966 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1219 (1984)).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

1156

[Vol. 44

In this case, however, the court held that defense counsel "totally and
completely failed to execute his strategy" by failing to elicit any mitigating evidence from medical experts at sentencing regarding Waters' mental
state and that there was no reason for counsel's failure to elicit testimony
that the defendant's mental illness affected Waters' conduct on the day of
the murders. 142 The court also opined that defense counsel elicited much
unfavorable testimony from his own mental health expert, Dr. Bosch, but
failed to elicit Dr. Bosch's opinion 14that
Waters, had a serious mental dis3
order and no criminal personality.
The Eleventh Circuit also*held that the attorney's decision to put Waters on the stand during sentencing was unreasonable.14 4 The court further remanded the case because the jury received absolutely no guidance
from either the trial court or Waters' attorney regarding how they might
45
consider Waters' mental illness as a mitigating factor for punishment.
In argument, the trial attorney argued to spare Waters' life so that he
could be studied and used for experiments."4 The Eleventh Circuit held
that counsel's delivery of a closing argument was more appropriate for a
mad dog than a human being and bordered on barbarity." 7 Judge Tjoflat
dissented. 148 Interestingly, one of the very reasons the court reversed this
case (defense counsel's closing argument) forms the basis of the Chief
Judge's dissent. He found that counsel's argument to spare defendant's
life so that experiments could be conducted on him was persuasive and
49
reasonable.
C. Right to Testify
The court addressed two cases concerning a defendant's right to testify
in his own behalf in United States v. Teague'50 and Nichols v. Butler.'"
Nichols was tried and convicted of armed robbery. The theory of defense
was that the prosecutor's eyewitness was mistaken about the identity of
defendant. In Nichols defendant's attorney denied him the right to testify. During trial, defendant and his attorney had an argument and the
defense attorney threatened to withdraw if defendant testified in his own
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id. at 1495.
Id.
Id. at 1496.
Id. at 1497.

147. Id.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 1498 (Tjoflat, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1501-02 (Tiofiat, C.J., dissenting).
953 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1992).
953 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1992).
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behalf.'2 The court held that if defendant had testified, the jury would
have been able to weigh his credibility against that of the eyewitness for
the prosecution and that the trial counsel's coercion prejudiced defendant
in this case. 6 3 In Teague the court held that defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by trial counsel's advice to defendant that
he should not testify, especially when the defense attorney's advice followed a careful assessment of the client as a potential witness.""' But the
court pointed out that the right to testify cannot be waived by trial counsel against defendant's will."
D. Right to Confrontation
In United States v. Lankford, 6" the Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial
court decision and held that a defendant's right to cross examination, as
well as his right to produce evidence, had been violated by the trial
court.' 5 7 Defendant, a former sheriff of Fulton County, Georgia, was con-

victed of extorting. money from the owner of a catering company that had
contracted with the sheriff's jail, and for failing to report that income to
the Internal Revenue Service. Defendant claimed he believed that the
owner gave him the money to defray personal costs incurred during his
campaign.16 The United States Supreme Court previously held that a defendant's good faith belief that one does not have a legal duty to pay
taxes can negate the willfulness of a tax offense.6 9 At his trial, the court
did not allow his attorney to cross examinea key prosecution witness regarding the witness' sons' state drug prosecution.'" The trial court also
failed to allow the defense to put on an expert witness who would have
testified about defendant's misunderstanding regarding his failure to report the money taken as income."" Citing Cheek, the court reasoned that
expert opinion concerning the reasonableness of the defendant's purported misunderstanding of tax laws governing campaign contributions
62
would have aided the jury in its determination of willfulness.

In reversing the conviction for the failure of the trial court to allow the
tax expert witness for the defense, the court, relying on Cheek, opined
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 1551.
Id. at 1553.
Id. at 1529, 1535.
Id. at 1532.
955 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1549-52.
Id. at 1547.
Id. at 1550 (citing United States v. Cheek, 498 U.S. 192 (1991)).
Id. at 1549.
Id. at 1546.
Id. at 1550.
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that the more unreasonable defendant's belief that he was not legally required to pay taxes seemed to be, the more an expert was probative to
demonstrate to the jury that defendant's belief was, in fact, a reasonable
one.

16

In a decision sure to be cited often in future trials, the Eleventh Circuit
recognized that the importance of cross examination of a witness who has
a substantial incentive to cooperate with the prosecution does not depend
upon whether or not a "deal" in fact exists between the witnesses and the
government." '" The court, in reaching its opinion, realistically viewed
human nature and held that the existence of a deal between the witnesses
and the prosecution is not the only basis for bias to exist. 11 " 'A desire to
cooperate may be formed beneath the conscious level, in a manner not
apparent even to the witness, but such a subtle desire to assist the state
nevertheless may cloud perception.' "166 In the present case, the witness

was the primary witness against Lankford. s6 On cross examination, the
defense sought to elicit testimony regarding the witness' sons' arrest for
the sale of a large amount of marijuana. The trial court disallowed such
cross examination on the basis that there was little likelihood that the
witness had reason to fear a federal investigation of the state charges
against his sons. 1" "Not-withstanding the fact that LeCroy '[the witness]'
had made no deal with the government concerning a federal investigation
into his sons' marijuana arrest, his desire to cooperate may have in fact
been motivated by an effort to prevent such an investigation."1 9
In his dissent, Justice Hoffman argued that because the defense did not
provide any evidence that the witness in fact had testified in hopes of
helping his sons, it was improper to imply it on cross examination. 17 0 The
dissent reasoned that because the court allowed the defense to elicit testimony of the same witness' bias due to his grant of immunity from the
Government, no reason existed to believe the additional cross examination regarding the witness'17sons would have affected the jury's impression
of the witness' testimony.

1

163.
164.
165.

Id. (citing Cheek, 498 U.S. at 198-204).
Id. at 1548.
Id.
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Id. (citing Greene v. Wainwright, 634 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1981)).
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Id. at 1549.
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Id. at 1555 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1557 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-DuE PROCESS

The court carefully examined and explained the difference between a
procedural incompetency claim and a substantive incompetency claim in
that James' Fourteenth Amendment
James v. Singletary,'"2 which held
1 3
due process rights were violated.

Defendant was tried and convicted of the first degree murder of a
Tampa, Florida couple and was sentenced to death. 17 ' Apparently, de-

fendant's competency was not questioned prior to trial or on direct appeal. 17" On petition for writ of habeas corpus to the Florida Supreme
Court, defendant raised the issue of his incompetency at the time of trial
with supporting affidavits by Dr. Krop.'M The Eleventh Circuit held that
the Florida Supreme Court misinterpreted defendant's claim as a procedural incompetency issue rather than a substantive due process issue and
denied the writ, apparently because the petitioner raised no trial court
opinion critical of the Florida
error. 7 But the Eleventh Circuit, in an 78
Supreme Court, granted petitioner's writ.1
The court, in a realistic approach, noted that due process is violated if
a person is tried while incompetent; whether any state actor committed
an error in bringing the trial about while the defendant is incompetent is
not required.' 79 But the Eleventh Circuit found that a petitioner. bringing
a substantive incompetency claim, as opposed to a procedural incompetency issue, must first demonstrate his incompetency by a preponderance
Here, petitioner presented medical evidence in his
of the evidence.'
habeas petition to meet this showing and the Eleventh Circuit accordingly remanded the case for a hearing on the issue of incompetency to
stand trial."'
In correcting this mistake, the Eleventh Circuit found fault with the
Florida Supreme Court in misinterpreting petitioner's allegations."I2 The
Florida Supreme Court had stated that Dr. Krop's report "'falls short of
stating that he [petitioner] was incompetent to stand trial.' ,,183 The Eleventh Circuit pointed out that Dr. Krop's report had concluded that the
172.
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957 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1992).
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Id. at 1570.
Id. at 1574.
Id. at 1569.
Id. at 1575.
Id. at 1572-73.
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Id. at 1575.
Id. at 1569.
Id. at 1574 (quoting James v. State, 489 So. 2d 737, 739 (Fla. 1986)).
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petitioner suffered from Organic Personality Syndrome, which contributed to James' lack of capacity to disclose pertinent facts, relate to his
attorney, assist his attorney in his defense, realistically challenge the
4
prosecution witnesses, and testify relevantly.1 18
The Eleventh Circuit re8
manded the case for an evidentiary hearing.
The Eleventh Circuit Court explained in great detail the distinction of
a substantive incompetency issue versus a procedural incompetency issue
as described in Pate v. Robinson.'" A petitioner pursuing a procedural
incompetency issue need only establish relevant trial error for the burden
to shift to the state to prove that the petitioner actually was competent
during trial. 8 In a substantive incompetency claim, however, the petitioner has a much greater initial burden to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the petitioner was in fact competent at the time of the
trial. Only then will the state be required to prove competency during
trial.' 88
It may be a difficult hurdle for a petitioner to prove incompetency
years after his trial. However, the decision in James does not require the
petitioner to allege as error the trial judge's failure to appoint an expert
to examine the petitioner or to conduct a hearing, nor does the decision in
James require the petitioner to point a finger at defense counsel for failure to raise the competency issue. 89 The petitioner must only raise incompetency to compel a hearing.' 9" "By contrast, a [p]etitioner raising a
substantive claim of incompetency is [not] entitled to [a] presumption of
incompetency and must demonstrate his or her incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence" to obtain a hearing."'
In Presnell v. Zant,'12 the court granted a writ of habeas corpus on a
death penalty case and ordered a new penalty phase.'" At the time of
closing, the prosecutor quoted Eberhart v. State,' 4 a nineteenth century
Georgia Supreme Court case, which suggested that the jury must exclude
any consideration of mercy from its decision." ' The Eleventh Circuit held
that this argument was "highly improper,"' particularly because defend184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
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Id. at 1575.
383 U.S. 375 (1966).
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and, therefore, orant had relied solely on a mercy plei at sentencing,
1 '7
defendant.
for
hearing
sentencing
new
a
dered
VI.

ARTICLE I, SECTION SIX-SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE

In United States v. Swindall,1 "8 the Eleventh Circuit held that the
Speech or Debate Clause1 ' privilege extends to the status of membership
of committees in either the United States House of Representatives or
the Senate. 00 The Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitution provides that members of the United States Senate and House of
Representatives shall not be questioned in any other place regarding
speech or debate.20 1 This privilege exists to reinforce the separation of
powers doctrine 202 and "to prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary."208
The court in Swindall reasoned that because members specialized in a
limited amount of legislation,
[i]f legislators thought that their personal knowledge of such bills could
one day be used against them, they would have an incentive (1) to avoid
direct knowledge of a bill and perhaps even memorialize their lack of
knowledge by avoiding committee meetings or votes, or (2) to cease specializing and attempt to become familiar with as many bills as possible,
at the expense of expertise in any one area. Either way, the intimidation
caused by the possibility of liability would impede the legislative process.
Prohibiting inquiry into committee membership thus advances the
Speech or Debate Clause's "fundamental purpose of freeing the legislator
from executive and judicial oversight
that realistically threatens to con2
trol his conduct as a legislator.' 0

The facts in Swindal are quite unusual. The Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") was investigating Swindall for his involvement with LeChasney,
who was later indicted for money laundering.205 Swindall never actually
consummated a deal with the undercover IRS agent or LeChasney and
gave LeChasney back a check, refusing to receive a loan from the agent.20 '
The IRS later closed its investigation against Swindall. 27" However, a
197.
198.
199.
200.
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grand jury called Swindall to testify regarding his knowledge of LeChasney's actions.20 8 During that grand jury inquiry, the grand jury questioned Swindall regarding his own knowledge of money laundering statutes and Swindall's membership in the House Banking Committee.2 09 He
testified that he had no knowledge of LeChasney's money laundering activities, but the Government alleged that Swindall perjured himself
before the grand jury to conceal his discussions
about illegal money laun210
dering with LeChasney and the IRS agent.
Although when testifying before the grand jury Swindall did not invoke
the Speech or Debate Clause privilege, the court held that the indictments, nevertheless, were invalid.211 The court dismissed those counts of
the indictment against Swindall that rested on the Banking Committee
and prohibited a new trial. 12 The court stated: "[T]he improper Speech
or Debate evidence likewise was fatal to the indictment ...

because evi-

dence of Swindall's legislative acts
was an essential element of proof with
' 218

respect to the affected counts.

"The Government itself argued that it could not have proved
Swindall's knowledge of criminality without showing the grand jury that
he was on the committees that considered money-laundering statutes."'
The court dismissed the indictment and precluded reindictment to deter
prosecutors from asking improper questions of a member of Congress.2 1
VII.

SEPARATION OF POWERS, ARTICLE II, SECTION I

As decided by the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Ucciferri,2 1
cases may be prosecuted in federal court even if it was investigated entirely by state officials and brought in federal court
merely to deprive the
21
defendant of the state's constitutional protection. 7
Defendant contended that his case had no federal ties at all and that
the prosecution brought it in federal court to avoid the more restrictive
standards of Florida state law regarding search warrants, surveillance,
and informants. 21 8 Although the United States District Court granted de208. Id. at 1538.
209. Id. at 1539.
210.
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fendant's motion to dismiss on that basis, the Government appealed.2 1
The Eleventh Circuit ruled against defendant and held that the separation of powers doctrine allowed bringing the case in either state or federal
220
court.
In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit relied upon its predecessor court's opinion in United States v.Mann.22 1 In Mann "the Fifth Circuit held that it is the prerogative of the executive to initiate criminal
proceedings and that courts should not interfere with the executive's discretionary power to control criminal prosecutions. 22 2 Because defendant
did not allege that the indictment was insufficient or that his constitutional rights were violated, the Eleventh Circuit held that no basis supported a motion to dismiss. 223 In reaching its decision, however, the Eleventh Circuit at least pointed out its concern of systematic transfer of
state cases to the federal system.2 4
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Eleventh Circuit covered a wide range of constitutional issues in
criminal litigation in 1992. Perhaps the most significant decisions, however, were the court's opinions regarding petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus filed by several death row inmates. By granting the writs in part
and requiring new sentencing hearings for these petitioners, the court acted as a safety net in the criminal justice system. In a time when the
United States Supreme Court apparently is seeking to limit petitions for
Writs of Habeas Corpus, these particular Eleventh Circuit opinions are
all the more noteworthy.
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